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NOTES
STUDENTS, URINALYSIS &
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES:
HOW VERNONIA 'S AFTERMATH IS
TRAMPLING FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Amanda E. Bishop*
INTRODUCTION: THE DRUG PROBLEM AMONG
STUDENTS
STUDIES SHOW THAT DRUG USE among the nation's
school children ages 12-17 has been declining since 1997.1 Fol-
lowing a survey by Monitoring the Future showing three years
of steady decline of drug and alcohol use among students in
grades 8 through 12, the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Donna Shalala, announced that the survey "confirms that
* J.D./M.B.A. candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
May 2001.
1 See Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education, Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Other Drug Use Drops Among Teens (press release)' (visited May 10, 2000)
http://www.pridesurveys.com (showing statistics that drug use among students in
grades 6-12 since the 1996 high has been declining); Monitoring the Future, Drug
Trends in 1999 Among American Teens are Mixed (press release) (visited Apr. 12,
2000) <http://monitoringthefuture.org/pressreleases/99dmgpr.html> (announc-
ing findings of the annual study of 8'h, 10th and 12th graders showing that teenage
drug use held steady in 1999); Advisory: Teen Drug-Use Remains Level in 1999,
Study Says, BusNEss WIE, Dec. 20, 1999, available in WESTLAW, All News Plus
Database (reporting optimism that teen drug-use has been declining for two years and
generally slowing since 1992, although a study by University of Michigan's Institute
for Social Research shows a leveling trend for 1999). But see Parents' Resource Insti-
tute for Drug Education, Students Use of Most Drugs Reaches Highest Level in Nine
Years-More report getting "very high, bombed or stoned"(press release) (visited
Dec. 10, 1999) <http:llwww.health.orglpubs/96pride/pr96.htm> (providing statistics
indicating increased drug use by students in grades 6-12 in 1995-1996).
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we have halted the dangerous trend of increased drug use
among our young people."2 To combat the remaining drug prob-
lem among school-age students, administrators have begun try-
ing to find new ways to control the perceived take-over of the
schools. Tactics have varied from school to school, although
attempts to address the mounting drug use problem have in-
cluded requiring drug tests after fights3, expulsion for poor per-
formance, locker searches, use of dogs to sniff for drugs4,
breathalyzer tests, strip searches5 , and most recently, urinalysis
tests6 . Under the protection of the landmark case, Vernonia
School District 47J v Acton7 , many schools have undertaken
programs that test distinct portions of their student bodies, most
commonly athletes, in an attempt to end and deter drug use
within their school populations. Such drug testing, in some
cases, has spread beyond athletes to include all students wishing
to join extracurricular programs. 9 To date, at least 12 states have
initiated school drug-testing programs, including Arkansas,
2 'Ecstasy' in Teen Scene, TORONTO SUN, Dec. 18, 1999, available in WEST-
LAW, All News Database (discussing Monitoring the Future, an annual survey con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
3 See, e.g., Willis by Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415
(71h Cir. 1998) (finding that a school program requiring drug testing of students in-
volved in fights was not justified under the special needs doctrine).
4 See, e.g., B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding unconstitutional a search of the entire school body using drug dogs because
of a lack of immediate drug crisis or showing of individualized suspicion).
5 See, e.g., Konop v. Northwestern Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.S.D.
1998) (holding that school officials did not have a reasonable basis to conduct a strip
search of students). •
6 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that
a school's policy of testing student athletes for drugs was constitutional); Trinidad
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998) (holding a school policy
which required suspicionless urinalysis drug testing of students involved in athletic
and non-athletic extracurricular activities unconstitutional); Todd v. Rush County
Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7 th Cir. 1998) (finding drug testing of students involved in extra-
curricular activities constitutionally permissible).
7 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
8 See Rhett Traband, The Acton Case: The Supreme Court's Gradual Sacrifice
of Privacy Rights on the Altar of the War on Drugs, 100 DICK. L. Rnv. 1, 2 (1995).
9 See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Little Rise in Drug Tests Seen at Schools After
Court Ruling, PRMLADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 10, 1999, at F26 (admitting that few
schools have undertaken programs but those that have, have not concentrated solely
on athletes); ACLU Freedom Network, Schools Drug-Testing Students Who Wish to
Join Clubs (visited May 14, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/w121099b.htrl> (citing id.).
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Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
10
The blanket mandatory drug testing of students participat-
ing in extracurricular activities is unconstitutional and against
the weight of even Vernonia. Implementing such programs does
more harm than good because it will drive the troubled students
away from the support and monitoring they get while involved
in school activities. Furthermore, with the misinterpretation of
Vernonia the idea of students' privacy rights has begun to lose
its meaning. This Note considers cases evaluating students' pri-
vacy expectations, challenges to drug testing programs before
and since Vemonia, and the policy implications of adopting uri-
nalysis drug testing programs in our nation's schools. The
analysis in this Note proposes a correct interpretation of Verno-
nia for application to future cases of drug testing in the schools
and suggests the impacts that wrongful interpretation could
have. The Note concludes that Vernonia is being applied incon-
sistently and often too broadly in the nation's lower courts.
Drug problems within our schools should be addressed and
combated, but not at the expense of our students' fundamental
Fourth Amendment rights.
THE SUPREME COURT ON URINALYSIS
TESTING OF INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETES
Since the decision in Vernonia in 1995, schools and courts
have grappled with the intended extent of the Supreme Court's
ruling." The Court in Vernonia held generally that student ath-
letes could be tested randomly for drug use. This holding, how-
ever, becomes quite narrow when considering the specific facts
the Court used to justify its conclusion. The Court pointed to
four distinct factors, unique to school athletic programs as op-
posed to other student populations, in its rationale.
At issue in Vernonia was whether the school district's pol-
icy to require student athletes to submit to random drug testing
in order to participate in school sports was constitutional. The
policy was unsuccessfully challenged on Fourth Amendment
privacy grounds. Generally, student athletes, as persons pro-
tected by the Constitution, have a fundamental right to be "se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
10 See id.
" See id.
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sonable searches and seizures" unless a warrant is issued upon
probable cause. 12 It is well established that when a fundamental
right is at issue the allegedly violative policy must withstand the
strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny test determines whether
there is a compelling state interest and whether the manner of
carrying out that interest is narrowly tailored to the ultimate
goal. Vernonia held that the government's interest in deterring
drug use among Vernonia's students was compelling enough,
especially in light of the diminished expectations of privacy of
the student athletes.13 This holding was composed of two parts:
1) a finding that a special need existed such that the warrant re-
quirement did not need to be met, and 2) that the testing was a
reasonable intrusion on the privacy of the students.
The Court found that the special needs requirement was
met in Vernonia, stating broadly that "'special needs' . . . exist
in the public school context."' Special needs were originally
defined in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,15
as needs beyond ordinary law enforcement or cases in which the
state's interest may outweigh the requirement of a warrant or
individualized suspicion. Special needs in Von Raab were found
to exist where the normal requirement of a warrant simply inter-
fered with the routine and necessary administration of a drug
test in conjunction with employment decisions for U.S. Customs
Officers. 16 The reason for a warrant requirement is to provide
facts for a neutral magistrate to determine that the permissible
scope of privacy violation has not been exceeded. 17 In the test-
ing of customs officers, the Supreme Court found that the test-
ing procedure was so well known to the employees and exer-
cised without discretion that the requirement of obtaining a war-
rant every time was unnecessary.' 8 The Court went on, however,
to stress that while the warrant requirement could be circum-
vented in that case, probable cause still needed to be shown in
other situations. 19 The nature of the position and responsibilities
of the customs officers was found to be highly sensitive due to
their close dealings with drug trafficking and the carrying of
12 U.S. CONsT. Amend. IV.
13 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657, 661.
14 Id. at 653.
15 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
16 See id. at 666-67.
17 See id. at 667.
18 See id.
19 See id.
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weapons.20 Based on the government's compelling interest in
safety and close monitoring of such a position, the Court found
the employees' privacy rights to be outweighed by the govern-
ment's pressing and timely need, thus equaling a special need
beyond what could be achieved through normal law enforce-
ment.2
Vernonia seems to say that special needs always exist in
public schools, but such a broad statement must be read in the
context of the case. In fact, courts since Vernonia have not
found special needs to be determinative in every public school
situation. 22 Even if the warrant requirement is inappropriate in
the school context because of the swiftness with which school
officials must act, the reasonableness of the search is still at is-
sue since the probable cause requirement would normally re-
main intact even with the identification of special needs.23
The three factors constituting the Supreme Court's ration-
ale in Vernonia were as follows. First, the Court established that
students have a diminished expectation of privacy within the
school environment as compared to the population generally.24
In Vernonia, the Court defined the School District's immediate
crisis in terms of the severe classroom disruption created as the
school became overrun with students under the influence of
drugs? 5 The Court agreed with the school that the student ath-
letes were the "leaders of the drug culture."26 This second factor
of an immediate crisis clearly identified with a particular stu-
dent population was found by the Court as highly important in
determining that the school had a special need beyond regular
law enforcement to act aggressively towards its students' drug
problem. 27
Next, the Court acknowledged the school's concern that
student athletes were at greater risk of physical injury while un-
20 See id. at 668-69.
21 See id. at 668.
22 See e.g., Trinidad, 963 P.2d 1095 (holding a public school's drug testing pol-
icy for students in extracurricular activities unconstitutional without finding that a
special need existed).
'I See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (discussing Fourth
Amendment principles and their applications to schools).
24 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57.
2' Id. at 648-49.
26 See id. at 649 (quoting the District Court in Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J,
796 F. Supp. 1354. 1357 (D. Or. 1992)).
27 See id.
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der the influence of illegal substances. 28 This was supported by
direct evidence of injury and disregard for safety among the stu-
dent athletes.2 9 The Vernonia School District faced a state of
rebellion that was described as utter chaos where teachers were
"at wit's end" and repeatedly observed students glamorizing
drug and alcohol use and actually using drugs. 30
Finally, in analyzing whether the athletes had a privacy ex-
pectation that rose above random urinalysis testing, the Court
considered the bodily inspection to which athletes were already
subjected. The Court determined that urinalysis testing itself,
which consisted of a student urinating into a cup in the bath-
room while one or more administrators stood outside the door
of the stall listening for sounds of tampering, was narrowly tai-
lored in its administration. The testing was likened to nothing
more than normal bathroom activities. A very important factor
in the Court's determination that such testing did not offend a
student athlete's sense of privacy was the nature of scrutiny to
which such an athlete already subjects him or herself. The Court
noted that typical non-private locker room, communal shower-
ing facilities, and even doorless toilet stalls evidenced the extent
of privacy a student athlete was used to.31 Furthermore, the fact
that students were subject to mandatory physical examinations
and that athletes as team players surrender a certain amount of
control to a coach were also cited as evidence that a student ath-
lete had already voluntarily relinquished most of his or her pri-
vacy expectations with respect to his health and body.32 It was
not simply that students were the focus of this drug testing pol-
icy that the Court upheld its constitutionality. All of these fac-
tors diminished the expectation of privacy for student athletes
as opposed to other students. To this effect the Court stated that
"it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed more
narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of im-
mediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he
is playing his sport is particularly high."
33
28 See id. (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357
(D. Or. 1992)).
29 See id.
30 See id. (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357
(D. Or. 1992)).
31 See id. at 662.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 662.
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VERNONIA'S RATIONALE REVISITED IN
CHANDLER
The Supreme Court considered Vernonia when deciding
Chandler v. Miller-4. In Chandler, the Court held that under the
circumstances mandatory drug tests could not constitutionally
be required of public office candidates. In this case a Georgia
State policy required candidates for certain state offices to
prove they had tested negative for illegal drug use through a
urinalysis test within a month prior to qualification for nomina-
tion. The test could be taken at the candidate's leisure through a
private doctor and required no reporting of results that were
positive. If a hopeful candidate tested positive, he could simply
opt not to seek office, thereby not revealing his results to any-
one. The testing mandate was based on the belief that "[t]he na-
ture of high public office in itself demands the highest levels of
honesty, clear-sightedness, and clear-thinking."
35
Despite the high values attributed to state officials, the
Court found that the required suspicionless and warrantless
search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.3 6 Can-
didates for office in Georgia brought this suit questioning the
policy's constitutionality under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 37 The plaintiffs argued that the drug testing un-
constitutionally infringed on their Fourth Amendment protected
right to be free from unreasonable searches. Georgia defended
its required search by arguing that special needs existed.
38
The special needs test failed in Chandler, however, because
the Court believed that inherently no specific danger existed in
drug use by a candidate for state office. While the Court ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of issues including integrity, ability
to perform official functions, and wielding of public trust, it
nevertheless found that these were symbolic virtues rather than
true special needs.3 9 A warrant could still issue in reasonable
34 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
35 Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1546 (1Ith Cir. 1996), rev'd. 520 U.S. 305
(1997).
36 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. The Court noted preliminarily that the testing
of an individual's urine by a governmental body constitutes a search under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 313 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Assn. 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)).
37 See id. at 310.
38 See id. at 314. See also discussion infra at 4 and accompanying notes.
39 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22.
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time to avoid any significant threat posed by an officer under
the influence of drugs. Georgia failed to prove that any drug
abuse problem was threatening the state offices. "A demon-
strated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary
to the validity of a testing regime ... would shore up an asser-
tion of special need for a suspicionless general search pro-
gram. 4° In Chandler, not only did Georgia fail to prove that the
drug testing program was more than a symbolic attempt to put
additional restrictions on candidates for state office, but addi-
tionally there was no showing that a significant drug problem
existed among the state officials. Normal law enforcement
measures were implicitly found to be adequate by the court in
dealing with Georgia's merely hypothetical drug problem.
In Chandler, the Court distinguished Vernonia as a case in
which the privacy invasion was warranted due to the "immedi-
ate crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students' use of unlawful
drugs." 41 The Court then went on to describe the enforcement of
the symbolic needs in Chandler as requiring no more than the
"day-to-day scrutiny" to which governmental office already
lends itself.42 Chief Justice Rehnquist described the majority's
reliance on this observation as perverse in its deviation from the
traditional strict scrutiny balancing test.4 3 The Court's holding
that no special needs exist where there is constant scrutiny of an
individual is important for future cases regarding the testing of
school students for drug use.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S READING OF
VERNONIA
In Todd v. Rush County Schools,44 one such program in-
tended to address the drug problem among high school students
came before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In this case,
students were prevented from participating in extracurricular
activities such as athletic teams, Student Council, foreign lan-
guage clubs, Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Future Farmers
of America Officers, and the library club without first consent-
40 Id. at 320.
41 See id. at 319.
42 See id. at 321 (quoting National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)).
43 See id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
44 133 F.3d 984 (7 th Cir. 1998).
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ing to a random drug testing program.45 Since most high school
students are minors, parents were required to sign a consent
form for their child to be tested through urinalysis for drugs,
alcohol, or tobacco. The issue in the case was whether this
mandatory drug-testing program violated the students' Fourth
Amendment rights.46 The school district defended its position
based on Vernonia, and the court agreed that Vernonia was con-
trolling as precedent and found that the school's policy did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
47
Due to the overriding interest in promoting education,
which could only be facilitated by combating the rash of illicit
drug use, the Seventh Circuit found that the Indiana school's
program sufficiently met the test set forth in Vernonia.48 The
court saw this case as substantially equivalent to Vernonia, dif-
ferent only in that it included extracurricular programs beyond
athletics. The court concluded, however, that the interest in pro-
tecting the students' health was key and saw no difference be-
tween student athletes and students voluntarily participating in
non-athletic extracurricular programs.
The school district in Todd felt that its program was legiti-
mately in the students' best interest because it was meant to de-
ter drug use rather than punish those found to be using drugs.
49
Citing one of its own district court opinions for support, the
Court said that participation in extracurricular activities is a
privilege and requires that students be physically and mentally
fit to represent the school and serve as role models. 50 As an in-
stitution acting in loco parentis, the school viewed itself as re-
sponsible for not only the education but also the health and well
being of the students.51 In loco parentis means that one is acting
"in the place of a parent." 52 Support for this view is found in
Vernonia, where the Supreme Court stated that "[c]entral, in our
view, to the present case is the fact that the subjects of the Pol-
41 See id.
46 See id. at 985.
47 See id. at 986-87.
41 See id. at 986.
49 See id.
50 See id. (citing Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309,
1320 (7th Cir. 1988)).
51 See id.
52 BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 787 (6'h ed. 1990).
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icy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the tempo-
rary custody of the State as schoolmaster.
' 53
The Seventh Circuit decision in Todd was indirectly af-
firmed through a denial of a petition for rehearing en banc.
54
Spectators see this as a green light for more such testing pro-
grams throughout the Seventh Circuit and the nation. Others
similarly interpret Vernonia broadly to allow widespread testing
of students.55 Four judges dissented in the request for rehearing
en banc and filed an opinion explaining their reasoning.56 The
dissenters questioned the interpretation of Vernonia asserted by
the events surrounding Todd. The dissenters posit that there are
three possible interpretations of Vernonia, all of which are plau-
sible from a reading of that opinion. Determining the intended
interpretation is crucial for application of Vernonia to future
student drug testing cases. Judge Kenneth F. Ripple explained
these three potential interpretations of Vernonia as being:
... (1) that "special needs" justifying drug testing always
exist in the public school context, and thus school authori-
ties may require drug testing for any reason including con-
trolling access to core classes, see, e.g., [Vernonia] at 656.
... ; (2) that it is necessary to show a particularized gov-
ernmental need to impose drug testing on a particular stu-
dent population, see, e.g., Vernonia's "state of rebellion";
(3) that drug testing is permitted in special scholastic envi-
ronments in which the need is well identified and the pri-
vacy expectations are diminished, see, e.g., [Vernonia] at
657.
57
Todd used Vernonia to stand for the first principle-that special
needs always exist in the context of students in public schools,
but focused to a lesser degree on the second part of Vernonia,
which then considers whether the search is reasonable. No
showing was made that the targeted student population was pos-
ing a unique drug problem, such as Vernonia's "state of rebel-
lion." The defendants also did not attempt to prove that the ex-
53 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
54 See Todd v. Rush County Schools, 139 F.3d 571 (7 th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 824 (1998).
55 See Richard Carelli, Justices Give Freer Hand For Drug Test at School;
Doesn't Violate Privacy Court, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 6, 1998, at Al.
56 See Todd, 139 F.3d at 571.
17 Id. at 572.
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tracurricular programs singled out constituted special environ-
ments with a distinct need to be free of the influence of drugs.58
In Todd, there was no study showing that students in extracur-
ricular activities had a higher drug usage rate than other student
populations 59, or that these students were "leaders of the drug
culture."
The Seventh Circuit stressed that the only differences be-
tween the present case and Vernonia were the specific activities
involved. The court went on to say that the health of the stu-
dents was the compelling reason underlying the testing of ath-
letes in Vernonia, and that the health of students in extracurricu-
lar activities generally is similarly compelling. 60 The dissenters
from the request for rehearing in Todd argued that if the singu-
lar factor indicating a compelling interest is a need for healthy
students, then there would be no limits to who could be singled
out for testing.
61
Certainly, physics class, math class or any other part of the
school's academic endeavor also requires "healthy students."
The assertion that students in extracurricular activities can take
leadership roles in the schools and the community is a general-
ity that does little to define, with the particularity suggested by
Chandler, a group that needs to be tested.62
The dissent in Todd went on to note that the Seventh Cir-
cuit's own decision in Schaill v Tippecanoe County School
Corp. "rejected explicitly the suggestion that athletics and other
school activities were similarly situated with respect to the need
for suspicionless drug testing." 63 With the rehearing denied,
however, Todd stands in the Seventh Circuit as an extension of
Vernonia applicable to at least students in extracurricular activi-
ties if not to any student who the school feels needs to be
healthy to function at his best-essentially any student.
COLORADO'S READING OF VERNONIA
Trinidad v. Lopez, 64 a case before the Colorado Supreme
Court, similarly addressed a school's attempt to curtail student
58 See id. (Ripple, J., dissenting from the denial for rehearing en banc).
51 See id.
60 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
61 See Todd, 139 F.3d at 572 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 572-73 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
64 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998).
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drug use through testing of students wishing to participate in
extracurricular activities. Plaintiff Carlos Lopez, a senior at
Trinidad High School was suspended from marching band, a
required course for his enrollment in music classes and subse-
quent course credit, due to his refusal to consent to a drug test
per the school's policy.65 The policy was instituted following a
study done by the Search Institute of Minneapolis to determine
drug usage rates among students in grades six and above. 66 The
findings of the report showed that Trinidad students' drug usage
rates were above the national averages.67 This prompted the
school board to implement a policy to test students involved in
extracurricular activities in order to combat drug usage through
deterrence. In the case of Lopez, however, being removed from
the marching band meant not only denying him a privilege but it
also affected his coursework since the music curriculum re-
quired participation in the marching band.
One of the important factors in Vernonia, weighing on the
side of an immediate and pressing need for the school to act,
was evidence that the school's athletes were "leaders of the
drug culture." 68 No such evidence was presented in Trinidad.
Instead, the school tried to justify its testing of the students in-
volved in extracurricular activities on the basis that they were
"representatives" and "ambassadors" of the school. This was
particularly true of band members, who wore uniforms display-
ing the school's colors.6 9 The relevant Institute statistics sum-
marizing student drug use, however, concerned drug use of the
student population in general. 70 "[Tlhe study did not quantify
the level of drug use among participants in the various extracur-
ricular activities. 71
Thus, the Court found that the statistics used by the school
did not show any specific need to test students in the marching
band or other extracurricular activities over a need to test all
students. 72 The Colorado Supreme Court limited its holding in
65 See id. at 1097.
6 See id. at 1098.
67 See id.
68 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646.
69 See Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1099.
70 See id. at 1099 n.8.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 1103.
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Trinidad to the unconstitutionality of the school's policy as it
specifically related to the marching band.73
THE CASE IN OKLAHOMA
In Oklahoma the ACLU filed suit on behalf of two high
school students against the Board of Education of Tecumseh
Public School District to challenge the school district's manda-
tory drug testing program.74 In October of 1998 the school im-
plemented a policy of randomly testing students participating in
particular school sponsored non-athletic and athletic activities
such as Academic Team, Choir, and Marching Band. 7 Students
had to agree to the drug testing policy or be banned from par-
ticipating in the specified activities.
76
One of the two students bringing this suit was unwilling to
consent to the drug testing program and was subsequently
banned from the after school music activities in which she nor-
mally participated.77 The music activities, as well as some of the
other activities targeted by the drug testing policy, were re-
quired as part of classes taken for credit during the regular cur-
riculum day. 78 Students were required to fulfill a fine arts credit
to graduate, and among the choices are courses such as band
and choir, which could only be completed by participating both
during classroom time and after school. 9 The other student
challenging the policy opposed the requirement that he be tested
in order to participate on the Academic Team.80 However, he
would not be required to take a drug test for his continued par-
ticipation in Life Guides, a group of role models and peer coun-
selors pledged to abstain from drugs and alcohol. 81 He worried
that subjecting himself to urinalysis could result in a false posi-
tive which, even if eventually rectified, would affect his mem-
bership in Life Guides and cause him to lose his status as a stu-
71 See id. at 1097.
74 See ACLU Freedom Network, complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Re-
lief, Earls v. Board of Educ. of Tecumseh Public School Dist. (W.D. Okla. 1999)
(visited April 5, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/court/tecumseh.html> (providing the
complaint as filed).
5 See id. at 25.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
'o See id. at 28.
81 See id.
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dent leader because he would be viewed skeptically as a poten-
tial drug user.82
The school initiated the mandatory drug testing policy fol-
lowing demands from parents that the school establish a strict
program to crack down after two incidents of drug problems in
the district's middle school. 83 The policy applied to all students
participating in "FFA, FHA, Academic Team, Band, Vocal,
Pom Pon, Cheerleader and Athletics." 84 The selection of these
activities over others that meet during school hours or on school
grounds is seemingly without basis, as the activities not in-
cluded are virtually identical to those, which are targeted. 85
Plaintiffs argued that there was no reason that selected activities
were singled out by the school.86
The Earls case has just begun to wend its way through the
courts, but the issues being raised are reminiscent of those in
Trinidad and Todd. Very important in Earls will be the issue of
the non-voluntariness of students' participation in curriculum-
connected after school activities. In Vernonia and its progeny,
voluntary submission to the rules and policies of extracurricular
programs have been argued as support for schools, allowing
drug testing programs to go forward. This argument assumes
that if urine testing violates one's individual sense of privacy
too greatly, one is not forced to submit oneself to the test, since
extracurricular activities are typically voluntary. However, this
is not the case when a student needs credit towards graduation
or as a resume booster as is the case in Earls. The debate in
Earls will also inevitably center around the lack of any specific
evidence that a drug crisis has presented itself at the school or
that the students in the particular extracurricular activities are in
any way creating that problem by higher usage rates.
OTHER RECENT ATTEMPTS TO DETER DRUG
USE IN THE EDUCATIONAL ARENA
In 1998, the Grapevine-Colleyville school district of Texas
considered a plan to test students involved in extracurricular
82 See id. at 29.
83 See id. at 14-15.
84 See id. at 33.
85 See id. at 34.
86 See id.
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activities for drug use. 87 The school believed that since 80% of
the students participated in extracurricular activities, the plan
would be useful in grotecting the students most visible in repre-
senting the school. The school felt its policy was in line with
other such programs across the state. In fact, at least two other
Texas school districts already conducted random suspicionless
drug tests.89 The school had attempted to initiate the program as
a voluntary program, but it was determined that the program
was not successful and the school moved to implement the pro-
gram as mandatory to combat the school district's image as a
high drug usage area.
90
Schools in Utah have also be un to consider and implement
drug testing in some instances. One high school, Mountain
High School, has a policy which tests students who have had
problems with attendance or grades, or have been in trouble for
fighting or possession or use of illegal drugs and drug parapher-
nalia. These circumstances under which testing is sanctioned
reflect an approach much more focused on individualized suspi-
cion and probable cause.
Students are not the only ones being targeted by random
suspicionless drug testing policies. A Tennessee teacher's union
has fought with the school board over a requirement that suspi-
cionless drug testing be conducted at certain events in a
teacher's career such as hiring, promotion, and so forth.93 Cur-
rently, teachers are only subject to drug testing when there is
individualized suspicion. At the Tennessee school, "[t]he board
seeks a much broader policy that tests teachers in four in-
stances: when they are hired; before they are promoted or trans-
ferred; when there is reasonable suspicion; and after they are
involved in serious traffic accidents." 94 A policy directed at
teachers is even more troublesome when weighed against a
87 See Kelly Ryan, Students Call Proposal for Drug Testing Unfair; Others Like
Grapevine-Colleyville Plan's Deterrence, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 14, 1998,
available in LEXIS, U.S. News, Combined File.
88 See id.
'9 See id.
90 See id.
91 See Hilary Groutage, Davis School May Require Drug-Test Consent, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Aug. 21, 1996, at B5.
92 See id.
93 See Paul Donsky, Money a Concern For Union, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 8,
1998, at 10B.
94 Id.
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teacher's expectation of privacy. The Court in Vernonia said
that "Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public
schools than elsewhere," 95 but this statement was made with
respect to the privacy expectations of students, minors in the
temporary care of the school, not teachers. Each case that ad-
dresses drug testing of students differentiates students' rights
based on the diminished rights of a minor in the custody of the
school acting as a surrogate parent. Teachers do not fall into
this category by their mere employment in the school arena.
THE NATURE OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS
Students have a fundamental right to privacy. It is well set-
tled that students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at
the schoolhouse gate." 96 However, because the continued ero-
sion of these rights often leaves one in doubt, it is important to
clarify that such fundamental rights do still exist. The right to
privacy has been diminished in certain circumstances as it is
balanced against state interests found to be compelling, al-
though it cannot be said that students no longer possess the
Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Justice White once stated
that "[a]lthough this Court may take notice of the difficulty of
maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation
is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legiti-
mate expectations of privacy." 97 Thus, while courts have found
that a lesser expectation of privacy exists for students under the
control of the school, students still have a fundamental right to
privacy that can be infringed upon only after successful passage
of the strict scrutiny test. The notion that students have not
completely been stripped of their fundamental interest in pri-
vacy is supported by the use of the strict scrutiny test by courts
in considering school policies argued to be in violation of stu-
dents' Fourth Amendment rights. 98 The courts have tacitly ac-
knowledged by employing this test that a fundamental right is
still at issue despite its erosion in the school arena.
95 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
96 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (cited in B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist.,192 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir.
1999)).
97 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
98 See generally Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d. 470 (5"h Cir.
1982) (using strict scrutiny in analyzing a student's Fourth Amendment challenge to
the school's use of a dog to sniff for drugs without individualized suspicion).
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The Supreme Court in Vernonia, however, does very
clearly state that unemancipated minors lack the full range of
fundamental rights which adults are guaranteed.99 Instead, the
Court admits that the rights remain, but with the caveat that "the
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in
school."'l Thus, Vernonia leaves fundamental rights fully in-
tact but asserts that those in conflict with the school's need for
order and discipline are tempered for the school environment.
101
The decision leaves in question the degree to which the rights
are diminished and in exactly which circumstances they are di-
minished. The Court notes that student privacy rights are less
than what would be expected by an adult in public, but stressed
the notion that the school's control over students is "custodial
and tutelary."'10 2 Given the many specific factors in Vernonia,
however, the Court's discussion of significantly compromised
rights may have been very case specific. If the students targeted
were not a population at high risk of physical harm due to their
participation in athletics, or students whose expectations were
not so lowered by regular communal undressing, then the ques-
tion remains whether their rights would be as compromised as
those of the athletes in Vernonia. A reading of Vernonia sug-
gests only that the average student's privacy rights are less than
those of an adult, but that these rights are different between
regular students and the student athletes in that case. In this re-
spect, Vernonia gives no indication of what other circumstances
could allow a school to intrude on the privacy expectations of
other categories of students. I argue that while the expectations
and therefore protection of privacy is less for students, Vernonia
does not intend to diminish all students' privacy rights the same
as it does for student athletes.
THE DECISION TREE FOR FOURTH
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES IN THIS ARENA
A constitutional challenge to urinalysis testing of public
school students involves a series of preliminary issues to be de-
termined before the policy can be upheld or stricken as violative
of the Fourth Amendment. First, it must be established that a
search took place. In challenges involving urinalysis, this ques-
99 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
'0o Id. at 655-56 (citations omitted).
101 See id.
102 Id. (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
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tion has already been definitively answered. The Supreme Court
in Von Raab agreed with the Fifth Circuit, which conclusively
established that drug testing by urinalysis goes beyond one's
reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore qualifies as a
search under the Fourth Amendment. 10 3 Once there has been a
search, it must be questioned whether state action was in-
volved. 104 Action taken by public school officials is state action
subject to constitutional scrutiny. 105 With respect to the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court in T.L.O. specifically noted
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects students' constitutional
rights against action by public school officials. 10 6 After
concluding that a search has been effected by state action, the
Fourth Amendment is implicated, and an inquiry must be made
into the reasonableness of the search.
The reasonableness standard involves a two-pronged test. 10 7
First, the action must be justified at its inception. Second, the
search must be "reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference."' 10 8 It is apparent from
T.L.O. that when extraordinary circumstances do exist for con-
ducting a search without the normal requirement of a warrant
and individualized suspicion, the search will only be legal if the
students' Fourth Amendment rights have not been interfered
103 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989) (referring to its earlier holding on the same day in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18, that urine tests are searches under the Fourth
Amendment).
104 One U.S. District Court noted: "If a search is being conducted by a private
entity and not under the color of state law, then it is not subject to the identical scru-
tiny to which actions of public officials are subject." Brooks v. East Chambers Con-
sol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Texas 1989).
105 See generally Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (deciding that
"the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by state officers").
'06 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (citations omitted).
107 See id. at 341, 343. The Court in T.L.O. explains that the use of the reason-
ableness test is necessary to "ensure that the interests of the students will be invaded
no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the
schools." Id. This remark suggests a balancing of the interests of the school and the
students more similar to that involved in a test less stringent than the strict scrutiny
test following the lowered importance of a student's fundamental right to privacy as
articulated in Vernonia. See discussion infra pp. 18-19 and accompanying notes.
108 Id.
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with more than is necessary to fulfill the school's interest in
preserving order in the educational environment.
10 9
THE FAILURE OF VERNONIA
The Supreme Court in Vernonia based its decision largely
on the school's need to deter drug use among a student popula-
tion which led the school's drug culture and presented an im-
mediate crisis. Schools implementing random testing programs
seem to have picked up only on the idea that the Court had
given the green light to testing distinct populations of students
within the school body, especially interscholastic athletes. Since
then, it has been easy for schools to justify their policies so long
as they closely match the policy at issue in Vernonia. Beyond
that, both the schools and the courts have been hesitant. No
school has succeeded in requiring random drug testing of the
entire school population, though several have tried. 110 For now,
it seems that schools feel comfortable to test only portions of
the school population that can be singled out as groups with
lessened privacy expectations, greater drug usage rates, or
heightened visibility in representing the school. This indicates
that Vernonia does not stand as a unified test for constitutional
testing policies but remains a conglomeration of factors of vary-
ing importance that schools can only attempt to scrape together
into coherent guidelines for following Vernonia's advice.
Student athletes bear the unfortunate brunt of the Vernonia
aftermath. The Court's focus on physical requirements of ath-
letes and their already greater bodily exposure during annual
physicals and daily undressing in the locker room have created
a meaningless line unless testing is to be limited exclusively to
student athletes. This speaks nothing to the interest a school
may have in making sure that all students participating in physi-
cal education classes are drug free. Based on the factors out-
109 See Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 764 (interpreting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 343 (1985).
10 See Traband, supra note 8, (citing Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.
1991) (deciding that testing the entire high school student body for drugs was viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment)); Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985)
(finding school's policy of drug testing any student suspected violating the school
drug and alcohol code unconstitutional as unrelated to actual guilt or innocence based
on tests inaccuracy); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg. Sch. Dist., 510
A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (holding that a policy to annually conduct a
physical and urinalysis test for every enrolled student is unconstitutional).
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lined in Vernonia, including the greater need for physical
health, the lowered expectations of privacy in the arena of
locker rooms and communal showering, it seems that if a sig-
nificant crisis of drug use was shown among the population of
students in physical education classes, this too would constitute
an acceptable population to test. With all of the other important
factors of Vernonia intact, this population would be the next
closest to that of Vernonia's student athletes in terms of lowered
privacy expectations and a unique need to be substance free.
The main difference with respect to students in physical educa-
tion classes is that their participation is not voluntary.
TO WHOM SHOULD VERNONIA APPLY?
Students participating in non-athletic extracurricular activi-
ties are not different from the student body as a whole except
that their participation is voluntary. The only exception is in
those cases in which participation is required in order to receive
credit for a standard curriculum course. Being a member of the
Library Club, for instance, does not require any physical exer-
tion that demands a student be more fit than the average student.
Illicit drug use, by definition, is illegal, but there are safeguards
protecting persons from being searched randomly for signs of
such drug use without individualized suspicion. Vernonia's ar-
ticulation of the Von Raab test for overcoming the requirement
that there be individualized suspicion and a warrant is that there
be a special need. 1 ' The state does have an interest in monitor-
ing minors for drug, alcohol, and tobacco use. The interest of
the school must be weighed against the invasion of privacy
forced upon the student and must be found to be compelling. In
the case of testing students who wish to join extracurricular ac-
tivities, there may indeed be a compelling state interest. In
Trinidad, the evidence did not show this compelling state inter-
est, however, as there was no study showing a higher drug use
rate in students participating in activities versus other stu-
dents. 112 Undoubtedly this is not the only instance where a
school has read Vernonia to allow testing of distinct student
groups but has failed to establish that a special need exists
within that group. Schools have repeatedly been prevented from
testing the school body as a whole, but testing students in all
IIl See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
112 See Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1099 n.8.
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extracurricular activities comes close to testing all students es-
pecially in the instances where extracurricular participation
rates are very high.'
13
Clearly, Todd and Trinidad can be distinguished from Ver-
nonia due to the lack of evidence specific to the targeted student
population, but the courts nonetheless came to different conclu-
sions, both based on Vernonia. In Todd, the court found that the
health of students involved in extracurricular activities was a
compelling interest as far as the school needed to show." 4 This
broad-brushed notion that an interest in the general health of
students involved in all extracurricular activities versus students
as a whole is a compelling interest is simply not a rigorous
enough inquiry into the required compelling interest prong of
the strict scrutiny test.
In Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated School District,
the defenders of a school's drug testing policy aimed at all stu-
dents in extracurricular activities asserted, without any evi-
dence, that the academic performance of students involved in
extracurricular activities somehow was harmed more greatly by
the use of drugs than the academic performance of students who
were not involved in extracurricular activities 1 5 The justifica-
tion for the school's program was therefore that students would
generally be safer in all aspects of their lives if they were drug
free. This is indisputably true. The court swiftly dismissed this
argument, however, saying that "[tihat rationale does not meet
the compelling need criteria necessary to undertake a search
without reasonable suspicion."" 6 As has been noted in cases
where schools attempted to test every student enrolled in the
school" 7 , the court in Brooks concluded that this type of pri-
vacy intrusion "cannot be justified by the global goal of preven-
tion of substance abuse."' 8 The desire to keep all students drug
free does not amount to a compelling interest.
Schools could conduct surveys to uncover evidence of high
drug use within a particular student group. However, this would
be a moving target and always miss the true intent of such poli-
113 See Brooks, 730 F. Supp. 761 n.1.
14 See Todd, 133 F.3d at986.
"1 See Brooks, 730 F. Supp. 759 (1989).
116 Id. at 765.
"7 See Odenheim, 510 A.2d 709 (holding that it is a violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments for a school to require drug testing of every student).
18 Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 766.
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cies. Instead, to set a truly meaningful standard for future cases,
it should be articulated that Vernonia stood for something more
than merely being able to show that a specific population had a
higher incidence of drug use than the national averages at any
given time.
NARROWLY TAILORED?-DOES WIDESPREAD
TESTING MEET THE TEST?
When the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches is infringed upon, that infringement must not only be
justified by a compelling state interest but also completed
through narrowly tailored means. The second part of the strict
test requires that the means of carrying out a governmental in-
terest be narrowly tailored. Another failure of the school pro-
grams that test students who participate in outside activities is
their failure to narrowly tailor the programs. When evaluating if
a program is narrowly tailored, one must determine if there is a
less intrusive way to achieve the same outcome. Assuming ar-
guendo that a compelling state interest existed to test partici-
pants of extracurricular activities, urinalysis is not narrowly tai-
lored to that interest.
In Chandler the Supreme Court noted at the outset that if a
special need was found, the testing itself was not overly intru-
sive since it could be done at a time of the candidate's choosing,
by his private doctor, and allowed him the ability to disclose the
results to no one if they were positive. 119 Compared to that in
Chandler, the method of urinalysis detailed in Trinidad and
Todd are more intrusive. The Court in Vernonia likened the test
to nothing more than normal bathroom activity. 120 This simple
dismissal of a procedure, which is, at best, humiliating, is inap-
propriate.
The intrusion of a urinalysis test, which can show any
number of things about a person aside from drug, alcohol, and
tobacco use, including the very individual and private matters of
pregnancy and the use of prescription drugs, is simply too
great to be permitted in schools.122 In Chandler, the court found
119 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
120 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650.
121 See Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1098. To avoid the occurrence of false positives,
pregnancy and prescription drug use must usually be disclosed upfront.
122 Drugs commonly tested for in schools with such a policy include marijuana,
cocaine, alcohol, LSD, and nicotine, in descending order of schools testing for each.
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that the intrusion was too great for state office candidates in
light of the public scrutiny they are subjected to on a daily ba-
sis. 123 Similarly with students in extracurricular activities, ob-
servation on a daily basis ought to be quite effective. Why
should observation of students be different from that of adults?
Teachers claim that drug use causes destructive educational be-
havior. If this is the case, teachers should be able to notice the
telltale signs of drug use among their students, at least in the
dire circumstances of an immediate drug crisis like Vernonia.
Furthermore, if schools are concerned that this will not detect
enough of the drug use, then perhaps we should be even more
worried about the students who are not under such frequent
vigilance by faculty, coaches, and teachers-the students not in
extracurricular events.
DRUG DOGS
In B.C. v. Plumas Unified School District'24 , the entire
school body was searched by drug dogs brought in to sniff the
students and their belongings. The court held, inter alia, that
being sniffed by a dog without individualized suspicion violated
a student's privacy expectations even though such expectations
may have been diminished with respect to the school, and
enough so to constitute a search. 125 The court then considered
the reasonableness of the search and compared it to its interpre-
tation of Vernonia: specifically that a "suspicionless search can
be reasonable if the school is suffering an immediate drug cri-
sis.' ' 126 Although the court acknowledged that a school's interest
in deterring drug use is compelling, due to the lack of an imme-
diate drug crisis facing the school at the time of the search, the
court held that the search was unconstitutional because the gov-
ernment's interest would not have been "placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion." 27
It is interesting to note that the use of a drug dog, an intru-
sion much less personal and less offensive than a urinalysis test,
See, e.g., Joseph C. Franz, M.D., Student Drug Testing Survey-Narrative (visited
2/20100) <http://www.freeyellow.com/members2/sportsafe/SurveyWeb.htm> (report-
ing results of survey involving 26 schools with drug testing initiatives).
123 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
124 192 F.3d 1260.
'" See id. at 1266.
126 Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-65).
127 Id. (citing Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314, quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624).
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was held to be an unreasonable search. Even though no evi-
dence existed to show that there was a heightened or immediate
need for dilution of the individualized suspicion requirement,
just as in most of the cases involving testing of students partici-
pating in extracurricular activities, random searches by drug
dogs have been found to be unconstitutional privacy invasions
where courts have not found the same for urinalysis testing. 28 It
is likely that this inconsistency is based on the uncertainty over
the interpretation of Vernonia.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Constitutional arguments aside, the problems with the drug
testing policies that have been described throughout this Note
are that they do not logically lead to the outcome desired by the
schools. Schools want to deter drug use, yet the expected effect
of a policy that tests a specific portion of the student body such
as students in extracurricular programs is to drive those at-risk
students away from the protective and constructive environ-
ments of the activities. Those students who really need the help
of drug counseling and rehabilitation should be encouraged to
remain in the schools and around adults who can monitor them
and identify possible drug abuse problems so that they can gain
the appropriate help. Students who are using drugs and know
that they will be tested before they can participate in after
school activities will simply not participate. Indeed the policy
will deter-deter the same students the school wants to help
from being around faculty often enough for their drug use to
even be noticed. The at-risk students will become the majority
of the students not participating in extracurricular activities, and
the school will have no way to monitor them as well as they
could have when the students were participating in after school
activities. At least when testing is not in place, the students who
were at-risk could be under supervision for longer than the
standard school day, assuming of course that the students using
drugs are typically involved in extracurricular activities at all.
With a testing policy, these students will instead spend more
128 See generally Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (51h Cir.
1982) (holding that a search of the entire school by drug dogs was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment).
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time on their own after school, most likely with no supervision.
This does not achieve the purposes set out by the schools.
129
Following this logic, schools implementing policies to drug
test the voluntarily involved students are likely testing the
wrong population. This was the conclusion of a survey done in
Indiana reporting drug use by various student groups. 130 The
study found that "many random school drug testing programs
are unlikely to detect drug use, since they often target the low-
est risk students."'131 In Brooks, District Judge Gibson of the
Southern District of Texas opined that the "students who par-
ticipate in athletics and other extracurricular activities are, in
fact, less likely to use drugs and alcohol, if only because Texas
law forbids students who fail courses from participating in ex-
tra-curricular activities, and presumably, heavy drug or alcohol
use will have a negative impact on academic performance."'132 If
this is true, students who may truly be in the most need of coun-
seling and rehabilitative help have probably already been forced
to forego participation in extracurricular activities.
One school announced that after the implementation of its
drug-testing program, participation in extracurricular activities
did not change. The reason, if it is indeed true, is most probably
not that suddenly all students previously using drugs and par-
ticipating in after school activities quit using drugs instantly.
The most obvious reason for steady participation levels follow-
ing the initiation of the program was that the school did not
have a drug problem among its population of students partici-
pating in extracurricular activities or that the program uncov-
ered students using drugs and helped them to be treated-a sce-
nario which is not addressed by the school. One would assume,
that students using drugs would be either forced to quit in order
to pass the drug test, or they would quit the extracurricular ac-
tivity rather than go through with the testing knowing that they
would not pass. If the participation remained the same, then no
129 One plaintiff notes that "we object to the urine-testing policy as an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy... [instead] [w]e want schools to teach our children to
think critically, not to police them." ACLU Freedom Network, ACLU of Washington
State Challenges Suspicionless Urine Testing for Students (posted Dec. 17, 1999)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/nl21799a.html>.
10 See Dr. William Bailey, Indiana Prevention Resource Center, 1998 Survey of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drug Use by Indiana Children and Adolescents (visited
August 18, 1999) <http:lpre-wwwserv.idap.indiana.edu:80/drugstats/athlete.html>.
'3 Id.
132 Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 764.
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students must have quit. This suggests that no students had a
drug problem, or the tests failed to disclose any drug problem.
In this circumstance, the school should not have implemented a
drug-testing program under Vernonia because no problem ex-
isted to warrant the school's compromising of students' privacy
rights.
Various studies strongly support the notion that drug use is
better deterred by keeping students in a supervised environment.
Extracurricular activities work to keep children who might oth-
erwise go home to an empty house doing constructive activities
under the watchful eye of caring teachers and school staff. One
study found that among students grades six through eight, par-
ticipation in extracurricular activities showed a minor yet sig-
nificant correlation with decreased drug use. 13 3 Statistics like
this make sense intuitively. If students are given enjoyable ac-
tivities in which they can truly excel and become constructively
involved, then there is less time for them to get into trouble with
illegal substances, get involved with others spending their time
dealing in illegal substances, or even become involved in
crimes. Another important study, based on data from the Justice
Department, showed that peak times for juvenile crime are 3-8
p.m. 134 The rate of violent juvenile crime is almost triple be-
tween 3 p.m. and 4 p.m.135, which strongly suggests that this
behavior can be attributed to the lack of supervision due to the
time students spend between school and when most parents ar-
rive home.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services also
conducted a study on the correlation between extracurricular
activity participation and activities they termed "risky behav-
ior," such as drug use, teenage pregnancy, smoking, criminal
activity, and dropping out of school. 136 The study definitively
showed that those students involved in after school activities
were significantly less likely to exhibit the risky behaviors con-
sidered.1 37 Based on such findings, we should want the drug us-
133 See Jeanne E. Jenkins, The Influence of Peer Affiliation and Student Activities
on Adolescent Drug Involvement, 31 ADOLESCENCE 297 (1996).
134 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDER AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE (1997).
135 See id.
136 See NICHOLAS ZILL, ET AL., ADOLESCENT TIME USE, RISKY BEHAVIOR AND
OUTCOMES: AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA iii (1995) (reporting the results of a
study on adolescent use of leisure time and its correlation to risky behavior).
137 See id.
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ers and at-risk students to participate in as many school activi-
ties as possible to not only give faculty more time to observe
them and potentially discover a drug problem without violating
the student's civil rights, but also to keep those students occu-
pied doing constructive activities rather than being tempted by
the illegal activity.
CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
Programs for the drug testing of students should fail in the
same way the testing in Chandler failed. Many, if not most of
the cases involving schools with drug testing programs do not
have evidence of any immediate drug crisis or even a drug prob-
lem by national average statistics. In Chandler, the Supreme
Court used the lack of any evidence pointing to a drug problem
among Georgia's state officials as grounds for its holding that
no need existed to infringe upon the candidates' privacy expec-
tations. Instead of granting Georgia the right to deter any future
potential problem of drug abuse in the state's legislature, the
Supreme Court found that any problem not yet existing as a cri-
sis could easily be monitored by the scrutiny under which state
officers are typically put and through normal law enforcement
means. The United States may never be able to wholly eradicate
the problem of adolescents using alcohol or illegal drugs. The
criteria of Vernonia require that a school have an immediate
drug crisis, which suggests that a school's problem be at least
greater than the national average, if not so great that the learn-
ing environment is being threatened by drug-influenced stu-
dents. In the instances where a school's drug problem is less
than a crisis, normal daily observation of the students and nor-
mal school policy enforcement means should be as successful as
the Court said it should be in Chandler. Without at least having
a drug problem exceeding the national average, no school
should be able to justify a urinalysis policy.
The test used by the Court in Vernonia was the special
needs test established in Skinner and echoed in Von Raab.
138
Special needs were defined as "interests other than the ordinary
needs of law enforcement."' 139 The Court in Chandler went on
to note that the need fulfilled by the Georgia statute was sym-
bolic rather than special since enforcement of drug laws could
118 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 311 (citations omitted).
139 ld.
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be achieved through the constant scrutiny of our public offi-
cials. 140 This decision followed Vernonia, which did not con-
sider the issue of being able to monitor students for drug use or
test them only when there was suspicion that they were a threat
to themselves and their peers. This would be best solution,
however, when considering the studies correlating drug use and
student activity involvement. Why Vernonia did not consider
daily observation a viable alternative, is probably because the
Court found a special need that went beyond normal law en-
forcement; specifically the crisis confronting the school com-
bined with the significantly lowered privacy expectations of
student athletes. Schools that do not meet all of the criteria of
Vernonia, however, should only be permitted the enforcement
leeway of Chandler.
Under what I argue is the appropriate interpretation of Ver-
nonia, in order to implement a urinalysis program, a school first
needs to show that its drug problem is real and has risen to the
level of an immediate "crisis." This should involve proof that
drug, alcohol, or tobacco use is hindering educational efforts
within the school, and that these problems are higher than the
nation's average. Anything less than this level does not permit a
school to degrade the fundamental privacy rights of all students
when a few troubled youths could easily be identified based on
daily observation of their behavior, attendance, performance, or
visible symptoms. Next, the students targeted by the urinalysis
program would have to be in a population whose privacy ex-
pectations had been as lowered as the expectations of the stu-
dent athletes in Vernonia. All of the factors described in Verno-
nia there played into the final conclusion, and without the exis-
tence of at least a majority of those same factors, no drug test-
ing policy should be upheld. 141 No group of students other than
the athletes and possibly students participating in physical
education courses is likely to meet these criteria. No other stu-
dents engage in school activities, which involve the same
chance of physical endangerment from drug use. And even
these students could not be singled out unless all of the other
criteria were also met in the particular circumstance.
So, the question remains what else a school can do. Short
of urinalysis testing, when the criteria of Vernonia are not met,
'40 See id. at 307.
141 See discussion supra pp. 5-7 and accompanying notes.
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a school should still be able to encourage students to be drug
free and demand that drugs not be a part of the educational en-
vironment. Schools have the power to employ normal means of
detection including urinalysis when individualized suspicion
exists. However, if the charge against a student in a case of in-
dividualized suspicion is mere possession, then a urinalysis test
is inappropriate. 142 As discussed earlier, searches involving drug
dogs have been struck down as unreasonable in circumstances
of schools unable to show at least that a major drug problem
existed within the school-if not individualized suspicion.
Schools using voluntary urinalysis or other testing programs are
theoretically acting constitutionally, yet these programs place
questionable value on students' privacy rights since voluntary
programs give parents the right to decide whether their children
will participate or not. This leaves schools to find other innova-
tive ways of deterring drug use through voluntary programs
aimed at rewarding students and not involving invasions into
their privacy. Schools remain, second only to the home, as the
best place for students to be monitored by many pairs of watch-
ful eyes for signs of illegal and dangerous activity. Encouraging
students to spend even more time in the company of adults at
constructive activities, is unquestionably one of the most valu-
able ways to enrich the student's life and encourage less risky
behavior. The bottom-line is that factors less than Vernonia do
not make up a compelling interest. As much as invasive policies
and tests could completely eradicate drug use among our na-
tion's students, courts have disallowed blanket policies reinforc-
ing that the students' fundamental rights do still have value and
weight against the valiant, but intrusive, endeavors of the
schools.
CONCLUSION-TEACH OUR STUDENTS THE
VALUE OF THE CONSTITUTION-THAT RIGHTS
MATTER
All of this leaves the impression that the decision in Verno-
nia may be an anomaly in terms of drug testing programs in
schools, applicable to few if any other sets of facts. However,
142 See Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 38-9 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (considering that
the vague conclusions of the urinalysis test rendered it inappropriate action for a
school to take against two students charged with possession of marijuana).
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drug testing of student groups, athletes and non-athletes, has
increased after the Supreme Court issued its ruling. 1
43
The belief that this program will not harm students is
flawed. Defenders of these drug-testing policies contend that
students or their parents who feel that this privacy invasion is
too great may opt out of all extracurricular activities. This
choice, however, should not be one we want to impose on our
nation's children. The opportunity to participate in extracurricu-
lar activities is important for students. Not only, as the Court in
Todd noted, are extracurricular activities imperative to many
high school students who want to build an impressive resume
for their college applications 4 , but these activities are also cru-
cial for the development of young people mentally and socially.
Furthermore, the observation in Vernonia that students do not
shed their privacy rights at the schoolhouse gate should be more
than a consoling aside. It should be a reality. Even if these
rights are diminished to a degree less than an adult would ex-
pect, they are not to be disregarded entirely simply because it is
easier to control minors if privacy rights do not "get in the
way."
Students who go out of the necessary curriculum to risk
humiliation and often go against peer pressure to join activities
and pursue their dreams should not be punished, and forcing
them to allow an invasion into an area where anyone not in a
public school has a reasonable expectation of privacy is not an
image of the democracy about which our schools teach. By con-
tinuing to degrade the privacy rights of students in public edu-
cational facilities, we are moving toward a frightening slippery
slope of permissible state "interests." The school may opt for
exercises such as testing all students for AIDS or pregnancy so
that the state can step in where individuals and families should
be free to determine for themselves how to deal with life's unin-
tended consequences. It is not the school's place to step in. Ex-
cept in cases where the crisis is so impeding upon education and
the students involved in the drug testing are in a population with
already particularly low privacy expectations with a greater than
143 See Nancy J. Flatt-Moore, Public Schools and Urinalysis: Assessing the Va-
lidity of Indiana Public Schools' Student Drug Testing Policies after Vernonia, 1998
BYU EDUC. & L. J. 239, 254 (analyzing school policy, especially in Indiana schools
following the vague boundaries of Vernonia).
'44 See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting District court's opinion, Todd v. Rush
County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1997)).
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normal risk of harm to themselves due to their continued illegal
behavior, urinalysis has no place in our schools. School should
be an environment where students are taught the value of their
Constitutional rights and encouraged to be constructive in their
behavior. Faculty and coaches observe the disturbances brought
about by substance abuse in the cases discussed in this Note.
This indicates that the problem can be dealt with to a great ex-
tent on the basis of individualized suspicion. If our schools have
come to such a point that they cannot instill those values and
take control of the problematic students through individualized
suspicion and normal enforcement means, despite the declining
drug usage rates, then there is a much larger problem that we
should address as a nation involving our parents' responsibili-
ties in raising their children.

